YouTube video

Jane D’Arista: Head of World Bank suggestion return of gold standard is grasping at straws

Story Transcript

PAUL JAY, SENIOR EDITOR, TRNN: Welcome to The Real News Network. I’m Paul Jay, coming today from Lyme, Connecticut. On November 7, the president of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, issued a statement calling for the reintroduction of some form of gold standard to establish the value of money. Why now? Now helping us to unravel all of this is Jane D’Arista. She used to be a congressional staffer working for the House Banking Committee. She’s now the coordinator of the SAFER project at the PERI institute, which is a group of economists working to come up with financial reform proposals. And she’s also the author of this book, The Evolution of US Finance. Volume 1 was a history of the Fed. Thanks for joining us.


JAY: Is Robert Zoellick’s proposal grasping at straws?

D’ARISTA: Well, what you’re saying is quite right. The gold standard or gold exchange standard under Bretton Woods was one in which the dollar was backed by gold and the US government offered to sell so many ounces of gold for so many dollars. It got to the point where the amount of US dollars held outside the United States by other people, foreigners, if you will, was so much greater than the gold supply in the US that President Nixon closed the gold window and said, we can’t do it anymore, we don’t have enough gold.

JAY: Now, what do we make of that decision? In whose interest was that decision?

D’ARISTA: It was considered to be an inevitability, on the one hand, but on the other hand, it had been the—people like Milton Friedman had been pushing for it all along and saying, well, let the market determine the price of the dollar, and therefore go to a fiat system where that market price depended, as you point out, on the value of assets. So, eventually, after some attempts to raise the value—to lower the value of the dollar in relation to gold, by 1973 we were on a floating standard and gold was not backing the dollar.

JAY: Is the underlying problem here sort of more profound than what they’re talking about? In other words, is the underlying problem that so much of capital is parasitical, so much of capital is actually not being invested in a productive process? It’s being either used for speculation or as part of these derivative gambling schemes. And you’ve described them as Ponzi schemes, that when you have so much of the global capital not involved in the productive process, you wind up creating bubbles that burst, bubbles that burst, and in the end, like we are now with American real estate and other parts of the US economy—and not only the US economy—nobody knows what a house is worth. In fact, nobody knows really what anything’s worth, ’cause if the truth of the bank ledgers was known, the whole system would—like, talk about hair on fire.

D’ARISTA: Would collapse. Yes, exactly so. That is really very true. The—it is a parasitical system in the sense—and, of course, I mean, we are—or going into the G-20 meetings, the United States is pretending to an innocence that they should not pretend to. The world knows exactly what’s going on. When the Federal Reserve’s—goes into the quantitative easing 2 that they’re going to do, they’re going to increase global liquidity. Everybody knows that the US banks—.

JAY: Okay. Just one more time, quickly explain what the Fed’s going to be doing here.

D’ARISTA: The Fed is going to go and buy a great many assets, $600 billion worth of long-term assets, in the hopes of removing them from the system so that—.

JAY: From the banking system.

D’ARISTA: Yes, or from the—not only from banks, but from—in any kind of financial institution—insurance companies, mutual funds, whatever.

JAY: Anyone holding Treasury bonds.

D’ARISTA: Anyone holding treasuries. Right. Companies, the treasuries of GE or whatever. And that’s going to put money in their hands to do something with. Now, what we know is the banks are not doing anything productive with it. At the same time that the Fed goes off and buys these government securities, takes them out of the market, and increases liquidity by that fashion—. I mean, if I’ve taken your security and I’ve given you money, you need to buy something else. So the idea here is you’re going to buy something else that’s going to gin up the economy. It’s a very nice idea but, it is not working in practice.

JAY: ‘Cause what they’re doing is a lot of the banks and corporations are going to take the cash and just take it to Brazil and earn more of a spread on the interest.

D’ARISTA: Precisely. What they’re going to use it for is exactly as you say, for the carry trade. In other words, they’re going to take—they’re going to be able to borrow short-term funds at a very low interest rate and invest in longer-term funds or higher-yielding (in terms of interest rate) assets in Brazil, Indonesia, etc.

JAY: Which will cause an inflation in these other countries, and supposedly make their goods more expensive, in theory.

D’ARISTA: Right. It will—what it will cause in these other countries is a rise in the value of their currencies, because those dollars are sold to buy the currencies of the countries in which they’re going to invest. That depresses the dollar when they’re sold. That raises the rupee or whatever the currency may be that they’re buying. And in the process of raising the value of the currency of a given emerging-market economy, you make them uncompetitive—now their goods cost more.

JAY: So it’s partly what Zoellick’s trying to deal with is the world saying, well, if you, America, can snap your fingers and just create $600 billion of new liquidity, then what’s the dollar? Then what is this whole currency system worth? And then he says, oh, okay, now we need to talk about gold. So what’s wrong with that idea of going back to some kind of a gold standard?

D’ARISTA: Well, it is not wrong that he’s raising the alarm. Many people are. But he’s not sophisticated enough in these areas to understand that gold will not work, that gold is produced primarily by two countries, Russia and South Africa. There’s not going to be enough. How are you going to evaluate who’s going to hold it? There are so many questions. You know, is it going to be held by the public sector? Or is it going to be the private sector, in which case it’s back to speculation?

JAY: Well, right now it is mostly—.

D’ARISTA: Which we have. Yeah, right.

JAY: There’s tremendous speculation in gold now.

D’ARISTA: Exactly. So if you want to do a commodity, I have colleagues who promote the ideas of Nicholas Kaldor, who was a British economist and who wrote very presciently in 1970 that when we went to the fiat dollar standard, that we would be taking a nation of entrepreneurs, i.e. the US, and making us a nation of rentiers, and that—.

JAY: Meaning?

D’ARISTA: Meaning that we would be living off other people. And that we would be an empire like the Roman, featuring bread and circuses to our people. Now, that appeared in The London Times in September of 1971. It was amazing. You could have written it every year since and it would have been true.

JAY: Is there a model that anyone’s proposed that takes the valuation of currency out of the world of speculation, in other word, links the amount of money supply and the value of money to how much actually gets produced?

D’ARISTA: Well, theoretically, yes. At the international level you would have to take the private financial system out of the game. That is exactly what Keynes proposed.

JAY: I mean, is there any real solution short of that?


JAY: So what would that look like?

D’ARISTA: Well, the Keynes proposal, which many people still favor, is a central bank, if you will, at the international level, in which the deficit countries could borrow, everybody puts something in the pot, and deficit countries can borrow, and surplus countries put in their surplus, and everybody pays interest, whether you’re surplus or deficit. And the idea is the Keynes idea that was proposed would only work if there are capital controls. In other words, you don’t have this free flow of capital.

JAY: That’s really the key, is it not?

D’ARISTA: That’s the key.

JAY: I mean, as long—essentially it all comes back to curbing the power of the finance sector and reducing the amount of capital involved in this parasitical part of the economy.

D’ARISTA: Exactly.

JAY: Which means an assertion of public interest through some kind of law, international and domestic.

D’ARISTA: Yes, yes, with the mantra that came in in the Nixon administration and right on through the ’70s and ’80s of the free market, backed constantly with all that money that flowed into the Heritage Foundation and others, that the main message there was let the market decide.

JAY: And the market seems to be deciding to crash the market, which people—which they know how to make money out of, too.


JAY: Thanks very much for joining us.

D’ARISTA: Thank you.

JAY: And thank you for joining us on The Real News Network.

End of Transcript

DISCLAIMER: Please note that transcripts for The Real News Network are typed from a recording of the program. TRNN cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.

Creative Commons License

Republish our articles for free, online or in print, under a Creative Commons license.

Jane D'Arista is a research associate with the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts, Amherst where she also co-founded an Economists' Committee for Financial Reform called SAFER (Stable, Accountable, Efficient & Fair Reform) and gave testimony to Congress on financial reform. Jane served as a staff economist for the Banking and Commerce Committees of the U.S. House of Representatives, as a principal analyst in the international division of the Congressional Budget Office. Representing Americans for Financial Reform, Jane has currently given Congressional testimony at financial services hearings. Jane has lectured at the Boston University School of Law, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, the University of Utah and the New School University and writes and lectures internationally. Her publications include The Evolution of U.S. Finance, a two-volume history of U.S. monetary policy and financial regulation.